Showing posts with label boards of directors. Show all posts
Showing posts with label boards of directors. Show all posts

Health Care Renewal Bloggers in Print on Conflicts of Interest and Health Care Corruption

Not to toot our own horn too loudly, but in the last week, Health Care Renewal bloggers have appeared in print three times.

Prevalence of Board Level Conflicts of Interest

We recently posted on a British Medical Journal article on the prevalence of what we originally termed "a new species of conflicts of interest," that is, conflicts of interest involving membership in boards of directors of for-profit health care corporations.  A shortened version of this just appeared as a (not very) "rapid response" in the BMJ here.  (Note though that the official date of the response was October 3.)

The New England Journal Series Calling for Rethinking the Problem of Conflicts of Interest

After the New England Journal of Medicine published an editorial and three commentaries earlier this year suggesting that concerns about conflicts of interest in health care may have been overblown, we pointed out that many of their arguments were supported by logical fallacies.  The Canadian Medical Association Journal has been publishing a series of news articles about the issue.  The latest one, published on November 17, 2015, ended by quoting HCR blogger Roy M Poses MD.

Health Care Corruption

On November 16, 2015, the Corporate Crime Reporter published a front page interview, "Roy Poses on Corruption in American Healthcare,"  The interview is listed here,  and summarized here but the full transcript apparently is not available online, but only in print and via subscription.  (Link to interview updated on 19 November, 2015).  

Academic Medical Leaders as Directors of For-Profit Health Care Corporations: the Prevalence of This "New Species" of Conflict of Interest Documented in the BMJ

The important conflicts of interest generated when academic health care leaders also serve on the boards of directors of for-profit health care corporations is suddenly less anechoic, thanks to some intrepid researchers and the British Journal of Medicine.

Background: Academic Health Care Leaders Also Serving as Directors of For-Profit Health Care Corporations

First Discovered Cases

In 2006, we first noticed that leaders of academic medicine also were serving as board members of large for-profit health care corporations.  The first example we discussed was that of Marye Anne Fox, Chancellor (equivalent to president) of the University of California - San Diego, and hence the person to whom the University of California, San Diego School of Medicine and its academic medical center report. The conflict was between this position, and her service as a member of the board of directors of Boston Scientific, a medical device manufacture, and the board of directors of Pharmaceutical Product Development Inc., a contract research organization.

Later that year, we discussed a "new species of conflict of interest."  At that time we wrote:

Medical schools and their academic medical centers and teaching hospitals must deal with all sorts of health care companies, drug and device manufacturers, information technology venders, managed care organizations and health insurers, etc, in the course of fulfilling their patient care, teaching, and research missions. Thus, it seems that service on the board of directors of a such public for-profit health care company would generate a severe conflict for an academic health care leader, because such service entails a fiduciary duty to uphold the interests of the company and its stockholders. Such a duty ought on its face to have a much more important effect on thinking and decision making than receiving a gift, or even being paid for research or consulting services. Furthermore, the financial rewards for service on a company board, which usually include directors' fees and stock options, are comparable to the most highly paid consulting positions. What supports the interests of the company, however, may not always be good for the medical school, academic medical center or teaching hospital.

Since 2006, we continued to find colorful examples of such conflicts of interest, e.g.,

- In 2006, the UnitedHealth board included multiple academic leaders, at least one of whom seemed partly responsible as a member of the board compensation committee for allowing the then UnitedHealth CEO to collect many backdated stock options (look here)
- In 2009, some attributed the problems at George Washington University's medical school that caused it to be put on probation to the conflict of interest of its provost and vice president for health affairs,  who also sat on the board of Universal Health Services, which owned the university hospital (look here)...

Through more recent years,

- In 2014, members of the AMA committee that has an outsize role in how the government fixes the pay of US doctors wer also found to be members of boards of directors of such companies as Kindred Healthcare, Hanger Inc, and Sante. (Look here.)
- In 2015, the academic physician and research unit leader nominated to be the new head of the US Food and Drug was a director of Portola Pharmaceuticals (look here)...

Look here for even more

Our Early Cross-Sectional Study

In 2007, we did a somewhat rough and ready research project based on 2005 data to determine the prevalence of such conflicts.  The results were presented in abstract form,(1) but not published as an article:

In 2005, there were 164 US health care companies in the 2005 S&P 1500, and 125 US medical schools. We identified 198 people who served on the companies' boards of directors who had faculty or leadership positions at these medical schools. Of the 125 medical schools, 65 schools had at least one faculty member and/or leader who also served on a health care corporation's board of directors. 15 schools had more than five, and 4 had more than 10 such individuals. Of the 125 schools, 7 reported to university presidents who were also directors of health care corporations, and 11 schools reported to vice-presidents for health affairs who were also such corporate directors. Four schools were lead by deans who were also health care corporate directors, and 10 schools had academic medical center CEOs who were such directors. 22 schools had at least one top leader who was also a director of a health care corporation. 36 schools reported to university boards of trustees which each included at least one director of a health care corporation, and 12 schools' own boards of trustees included at least one such director.

We concluded:

more than one-half of US medical schools had a leader or faculty member who also was a director of a major US for-profit publicly traded Bpure^ health care corporation, more than one-sixth of schools had a top leader who was also such a director, and more than one-fifth reported to boards of trustees which included such directors.

More Modern and Complete Data

Unfortunately, we never wrote a full paper about this work, although the likelihood we could have gotten it published around 2007 was very small.  It is fortunate that Anderson and colleagues did a more complete and current version of this project, which was published online this week by the British Medical Journal.(2)

Methods

Their methodology was similar to our earlier work, but more sophisticated.  They obtained data on the 2013 board members of 446 public for-profit US companies listed on New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ and classified as in the healthcare sector, including pharmaceutical, biotechnology, medical equipment and supply companies and health care providers from the companies' 2014 proxy statements.

Results

Their results were striking, suggesting even a greater prevalence of conflicted academic leaders than our preliminary results suggested

Directors were affiliated with 85 geographically diverse non-profit academic institutions, including 19 of the top 20 National Institute of Health funded medical schools and all of the 17 US News honor roll hospitals. Overall, these 279 academically affiliated directors included 73 leaders, 121 professors, and 85 trustees. Leaders included 17 chief executive officers and 11 vice presidents or executive officers of health systems and hospitals; 15 university presidents, provosts, and chancellors; and eight medical school deans or presidents.

The new study also described the direct financial relationships among the academic leaders, professors and trustees and the corporations on whose boards they served.

The total annual compensation to academically affiliated directors for their services to companies was $54 995 786 (£35 836 000; €49 185 900) (median individual compensation $193 000) and directors beneficially owned 59 831 477 shares of company stock (median 50 699 shares).

Discussion

As we have suggested, Anderson et al stated that being on the board of directors of a for-profit health care corporation creates conflicts of interest beyond those created by simply having a financial relationship with a health care company, e.g., by participating in a commercially sponsored research project or acting as a consultant to a company.

Similar to individuals engaging in consulting relationships, directors on industry boards enter a formal contract with the company and receive financial payment for services; however, they are subject to two important differences. Firstly, unlike consultants who are compensated to provide expertise on a specific issue, directors are subject to a fiduciary responsibility to company shareholders to advance the general interests of the company and increase profits. Secondly, directors are reimbursed both through larger cash fees than typical consulting contracts and through stock options, the value of which is directly tied to the financial success of the company.

They also added the reminder that,

Though the missions of academia and for profit companies can overlap, they may also diverge, specifically when the for profit mission of industry competes with the non-profit taxpayer funded clinical and research missions of academic medical and research institutions.

So,

previous guidelines have emphasized the relationships of clinicians and researchers with industry, but institutional conflicts of interest, which arise when administrators, including executive officers, trustees, and clinical leaders have a financial relationship with industry, are increasingly recognized and pose a unique set of risks to academic missions. 

Our Summary

We have written again and again on the problem of conflicts of interest affecting health care professionals, academics, and policy makers.  The worst such conflicts may occur when individuals are simultaneously leaders of large mission-oriented health care non-profit organizations, such as teaching hospitals, medical schools, or research institutes, and board members of for-profit health care corporations.  Despite our attempts to raise such issues as important, and probably important causes of health care dysfunction, they have remained anechoic.

Now a broadly based study of this no longer so "new species" of conflict of interest has appeared in one of the biggest and most prestigious medical journals.  Let us hope it will bring this issue to the forefront, and also partially counter those who have been preaching that concerns about conflicts of interest in health care are overblown.

As we have said again and again, the web of conflicts of interest that is pervasive in medicine and health care is now threatening to strangle medicine and health care.  Furthermore, this web is now strong enough to have effectively transformed US health care into an oligarchy or plutocracy.  Health care is effectively run by a relatively small group of people, mainly professional managers plus a few (lapsed?) health care professionals, who simultaneously run or influence multiple corporations and organizations.

For patients and the public to trust health care professionals and health care organizations, they need to know that these individuals and organizations are putting patients' and the public's health ahead of private gain. Health care professionals who care for patients, those who teach about medicine and health care, clinical researchers, and those who make medical and health care policy should do so free from conflicts of interest that might inhibit their abilities to put patients and the public's health first.

Health care professionals ought to make it their highest priority to ensure that the organizations for which they work, or with which they interact also put patients' and the public's health ahead of private gain, especially the private gain of the organizations' leaders and their cronies.

ADDENDUM (16 November, 2015) - Note that an abbreviated version of this post has appeared as an electronic "rapid response" to the article by Anderson et al (link here), although the published form has on it our original submission date.   

References

1. Poses RM, Smith WR, Crausman R, Maulitz R. Selling them the rope: prevalence of for-profit health care corporate dirctors among academic medical leaders. J Gen Intern Med 2007; 22 (Suppl 1): 98.
2.  Anderson TS, Good CB, Gellad WF.  Prevalence and compensation of academic leaders, professors and trustees on publicly trade US healthcare company boards of directors: cross sectional study.  Brit Med J 2015; 351:h4826.  Link here

Turn That Door Around - A Physician Substantially Tied to the Pharmaceutical Industry Nominated to Run the FDA

It seems to be the season of the revolving door in health care.  The latest version got some media attention, because it involves one of the most important health care leadership positions in the US government, the Director of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  However, the case actually seems much more serious than what the media has recently reported.

The Basics

For an introduction, we turn to the Wall Street Journal from September 15, 2015:

President Barack Obama plans to nominate the prominent cardiologist and medical researcher Robert Califf as the next commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration, the White House said Tuesday.

Dr. Califf had been named the FDA’s deputy commissioner for medical products and tobacco—effectively the No. 2 post—in February. He joined the FDA from Duke University, where he had served as a professor of medicine, a leading pharmaceutical researcher and the vice chancellor for clinical and translational research.

The new nomination got some rave reviews. For example, from the WSJ article,

Francis Collins, director of the National Institutes of Health and a scientist who has worked with Dr. Califf for years, called this 'a fantastic nomination.'

Then this in the NY Times (Sept 15, 2015):

'He’s never forgotten that at his core he’s a doctor, and he cares deeply about providing evidence to help people take better care of patients,' said Dr. Robert Harrington, professor and chairman of the department of medicine at the Stanford University School of Medicine, who worked with Dr. Califf at Duke.

Also, a MedPage Today article was entitled, "Califf Nomination for FDA Chief Gets Most High Marks," and included such testimonials as,

'He has a very good understanding of industry and academia, and think that will serve him well,' Caleb Alexander, MD, co-director of the Johns Hopkins Center for Drug Safety and Effectiveness in Baltimore, told MedPage Today....

Also, this from Dr Harlan Krumholz,

He's a broad thinker and a very creative and visionary individual. He will be an outstanding choice.

And this from Dr Sanjay Kaul,

I can't think of a more qualified person than Dr. Califf to lead the FDA at the present time. He is an accomplished leader in cardiovascular disease research whose work has resulted in therapies that save lives and improve the quality of life for millions of patients.
Is it time to break out the confetti yet?

Conflicts of Interest a Fly in the Ointment?

The only fly in the ointment was the matter of Dr Califf's ties to industry. The WSJ article included,

Diana Zuckerman, president of the National Center for Health Research, a Washington-based group focusing on medical-product safety, questioned his ties to the drug industry.

'Dr. Califf’s expertise and his close ties to the pharmaceutical industry are both well-known,' she said. 'His ties to industry have been a source of great concern to public-health experts when he was previously considered for FDA commissioner, and those ties raise important questions about this nomination.'

The MedPage Today article noted that Public Citizen's Health Research Group stated,

'During his tenure at Duke University, Califf racked up a long history of extensive financial ties to multiple drug and device companies, including Amgen, Astra-Zeneca, Eli Lilly, Johnson & Johnson, Merck Sharpe & Dohme and Sanofi-Aventis, to name a few,' Michael Carome, MD, the group's director, said in a statement. 'Strikingly, no FDA commissioner has had such close financial relationships with industries regulated by the agency prior to being appointed.'

The MedPage Today article, however, then went on to undermine those concerns, implying that only fringe people like those at Public Citizen were really worried. 

Most experts contacted by MedPage Today seemed to think Califf would not have a problem getting Senate confirmation. 'I expect him to be confirmed," said [Dr. Steven] Nissen. 'He is very well liked by people ... in both parties, and I would expect the nomination to go well.'

'All signals suggest that Dr. Califf is well-respected on both sides of the political aisle,' Jay Wolfson, DrPH, JD, senior associate dean at the University of South Florida's Morsani College of Medicine, in Tampa, said in an email.

'There are some who believe his relationship with [the drug industry] may be a problem, but most see it as a value-added factor in building a functional, more streamlined relationship with the industry in order to improve the speed with which truly effective and quality drugs and devices are made available, mitigate the excessive costs associated with pharmaceuticals, and influence policies and practices intended to improve health status.'

Note that the experts were not all named, or their expertise described, the first two paragraphs were really about Dr Califf's political support, and the third paragraph clearly reflected the views of someone who thought that the FDA needs to have a lighter regulatory touch. 

There was additional reporting about Dr Califf's conflicts of interest, but again with the effect of minimizing their importance.  The Wall Street Journal published a second article on September 18, 2015 which first reported,

From 2009 through early 2015, Dr. Califf received consulting fees of roughly $205,000 from companies including Johnson & Johnson, Merck & Co., GlaxoSmithKline PLC and one medical-device maker, records show. The payments are documented by the federal Open Payments database, and PharmaShine, a database of pharmaceutical disclosures operated by Obsidian Healthcare Disclosure Services LLC. Drug makers spent an additional $21,000 on travel, meals and other expenses for Dr. Califf, data show.

But the article provided this counterpoint,

Kevin Griffis, a spokesman for the Department of Health and Human Services, said Dr. Califf had ceased all work with drug makers once he was hired by the FDA and that he has gone through a rigorous screening process for potential conflicts of interest. Mr. Griffis said Dr. Califf had donated all the consulting fees he has received since the mid-2000s to nonprofit groups.

'Dr. Robert Califf’s professional career has been dedicated to advancing biomedical research, including the rigorous evaluation of the safety, efficacy and appropriate use of both new medical products and those already on the market,' said Mr. Griffis, assistant secretary for public affairs at HHS.

Note that Dr Califf already is at the FDA, in a position that I do not believe required Senate confirmation.  It is striking, however, how the agency's own public relations people have jumped to his defense now as a nominee who has to be confirmed by the Senate.  However, I suppose that had Dr Califf donated all this fees to a local soup kitchen, they could not be called much of a conflict of interest.  But Mr Griffis said "nonprofit groups," without specification, not "soup kitchens." And continue reading to find out more. 

A simultaneous NY Times article enlarged a bit on Dr Califf's industry relationships,

He has written scientific papers with pharmaceutical company researchers, and his financial disclosure form last year listed seven drug companies and a device maker that paid him for consulting and six others that partly supported his university salary, including Merck, Novartis and Eli Lilly. A conflict-of-interest section at the end of an article he wrote in the European Heart Journal last year declared financial support from more than 20 companies.

However the NYT article also quoted Mr Griffis about the donations to "nonprofits," and added,

A résumé studded with industry funding is not unusual in academic medicine, Dr. Califf’s supporters note. Doctors are paid consulting fees all the time, and universities routinely conduct clinical trials on behalf of companies. Those contracts help support university researchers’ salaries, a standard practice. Many emphasize that it does not imply an inherent conflict.

His supporters contend that Dr. Califf’s vast experience in the clinical science world could be a major asset in his new post.

Furthermore,

Supporters and former colleagues say Dr. Califf’s background makes him perfectly suited to the job of commissioner. He has spent years improving the way clinical trials are conducted, coming up with groundbreaking trial designs for medicines against blood clots.

'His integrity in scientific matters is impeccable, and his innovation in clinical trial design is legendary,' said Dr. Steven Nissen, a cardiologist at the Cleveland Clinic, who has been an outspoken critic of both the F.D.A. and drug companies.

Even better,

Dr. Califf is often in the gym on the StairMaster before 6 a.m., said a former colleague at Duke, Dr. Adrian Hernandez. He often invites younger doctors to join him in golf and has a passion for Duke basketball that he expresses by wearing the team colors on game days.

How could anyone criticize a man who is at the gym at 6 AM?

More seriously, note that while the recent reporting may bring up questions about Dr Califf's conflicts of interest in terms of financial relationships with drug, device and biotechnology companies when he was on the Duke faculty, all the reporting also included passages minimizing the importance of these conflicts.  To minimize the issue of conflicts of interest, articles cited unnamed experts, suggesting the logical fallacy of an appeal to authority; noted that the financial ties that were criticized are standard practice in academic health care, suggesting the logical fallacy of an appeal to common practice.  The articles also cited Dr Califf's positive attributes which may have been relevant to his work at the FDA, like knowledge of research, but were not related to the question of conflicts of interest. This suggests another appeal to authority, or something of a reverse ad hominem (pro hominem?) fallacy.  It seems odd that what appear to be straightforward journalistic reports of a presidential nomination included such attempts to defend the candidate.  Note further that many of these logical fallacies appeared not in quotes from Dr Califf's supporters, but in text apparently written by journalists (e.g., "industry funding is not unusual," "in the gym on the Stairmaster," etc.)

Nonetheless, this is the state of play as of this moment.  The thrust of the media coverage suggested that Dr Califf is a brilliant physician and researcher, and while he as some ties to industry, they do not amount to much of a problem, except in the eyes of the likes of Public Citizen.


If one digs deeper, however, there is more. When Dr Califf was appointed to his current FDA position in February, 2015, and years earlier when his name was first mentioned as a possible candidate to run the FDA, evidence appeared that his ties to pharmaceutical, biotechnology and device companies were much more serious than what the recent accounts suggested.  

Where Does the Money from Industry Sponsored Research Grants Go? 

The recent coverage of Dr Califf's nomination in the NY Times dismissed his multiple corporate research grants as common practice.  Yet in the TIME coverage of  his original appointment to the FDA in February, 2015, this reminder of the significance of corporate sponsored research grants appeared.

Califf says his salary is contractually underwritten in part by several large pharmaceutical companies, including Merck, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Eli Lilly and Novartis.

Note that apologists for physician and academician interaction with industry often claim that industry funding of research grants that does not go directly to individuals does not cause important conflicts of interest. In one sentence, however, this article underlined how these grants support academic salaries, and hence lead to the dependency that is at the heart of conflicted relationships.

As we posted in 2007, academic medical institutions now depend on "external," including corporate research funding to support their research faculty's salaries, and via "overhead," their overall budgets.  Dr Lee Goldman, then Dean and Executive Vice President at Columbia University, called faculty who bring in a lot of grant money "tax payers," who earn gratitude, and likely bonuses and perks.  Thus Dr Califf's multiple large corporate research grants cannot be completely dismissed as conflicts of interest. 


A More Extensive List of Industry Relationships

Furthermore, a relatively obscure February, 2015, report from MDDIOnline noted that Dr Califf had more industry relationships than were reported this month,

Conflict of interest disclosures dating back to 2007 made public by the DCRI show that Califf has been paid for consulting or other services provided to a number of medical device pharmaceutical, and biotech companies, including Medtronic, Acumed, Bayer Healthcare, Merck, Novartis, Roche, GlaxoSmithKline, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Sanofi-Aventis, and Eli Lilly & Co. Califf also disclosed that he held equity in two pharmaceutical companies—Boulder-based N30 Pharmaceuticals and South San Francisco, CA-based Portola Pharmaceuticals—as recently as 2014. Califf retired from Portola’s board of directors January 26, according to a press release from the company.
A somewhat more obscure commentary by Martha Rosenberg in OpEdNews provided even more extensive listings of Dr Califf's industry relationships. And it suggested having a look at the disclosures he has made in the past in medical journal articles. A statement in a 2013 JAMA commentary was particularly telling,


Dr Califf receives research grants that partially support his salary from Amylin, Johnson & Johnson, Scios, Merck/Schering-Plough, Schering-Plough Research Institute, Novartis Pharma, Bristol-Myers Squibb Foundation, Aterovax, Bayer, Roche, and Lilly; all grants are paid to Duke University. Dr Califf also consults for TheHeart.org, Johnson & Johnson, Scios, Kowa Research Institute, Nile, Parkview, Orexigen Therapeutics, Pozen, WebMD, Bristol-Myers Squibb Foundation, AstraZeneca, Bayer/Ortho-McNeil, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Boehringer Ingelheim, Daiichi Sankyo, Gilead, GlaxoSmithKline, Li Ka Shing Knowledge Institute, Medtronic, Merck, Novartis, sanofi-aventis, XOMA, University of Florida, Pfizer, Roche, Servier International, DSI-Lilly, Janssen R&D, CV Sight, Regeneron, and Gambro; all income from these consultancies is donated to nonprofit organizations, with most going to the clinical research fellowship fund of the Duke Clinical Research Institute. Dr Califf holds equity in Nitrox LLC, N30 Pharma, and Portola.

These lists of corporations from which Dr Califf got salary support and consulting fees are much longer than previous lists.  He acknowledged 13 commercial research sponsors, and consulted for 32 organizations, most of which were pharmaceutical companies.  Again, given that the salary support and overhead likely supplied by corporate research grants do suggest conflicts of interest, Dr Califf may have had many more of these sorts of conflicts than current reports implied  

A Seat on a Pharmaceutical Company Board of Directors

Note that the MDDIOnline article mentioned that Dr Califf was a member of the board of directors of Portola Pharmaceuticals. That was a significant source of income.  According to the Portola Pharmaceuticals 2015 proxy statement, Dr Califf received $259,623 in cash and stock options from the company in 2014.  I cannot find anything to suggest that this payment did not go directly to him.  This position, and the money it paid were not mentioned in the recent coverage. That payment alone seems to represent a major conflict of interest.

However, being on the board of directors of a health care corporation presents a deeper conflict than that produced by a simple payment of money or stock options, no matter how large. In 2006, we discussed corporate directorships as a new and important species of conflict of interest for medical academics.  As we have previously posted, corporate directors have fiduciary responsibilities to the company and its shareholders to support its financial success.  They are supposed to "demonstrate unyielding loyalty to the company's shareholders" [Per Monks RAG, Minow N. Corporate Governance, 3rd edition. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. P.200.]   Thus corporate directors have a much more significant commitment to the corporation than do corporate consultants, or researchers supported by corporate grants. 

Where Did Those Donated Consulting Payments Go?

Also note that the disclosure statement in the JAMA article mentioned that most of the consulting payments Dr Califf received went to the clinical research fellowship of the Duke Clinical Research Institute (DCRI).  Dr Califf was the first director of DCRI, 

So, while Dr Califf apparently did donate the consulting fees to a non-profit organization, that organization actually was part of Duke, and an organization that Dr Califf once led. It appears likely that Dr Califf benefited at least indirectly in terms of institutional gratitude and reputation from these consulting fees that he donated to his own institution.  So it appears that Dr Califf's donations of his consulting fees did not reduce the conflicts of interest generated by these fees to the extent suggested by the current FDA spokesperson and current media reports. 

Payments for "Educational Activities" 

Finally, perusal of disclosures of Dr Califf's commercial relationships made by the Duke Clinical Research Institute for the years 2010-2015 showed that he received payments for "educational activities" in 2011 from Amylin.  Information about earlier years is not available on this site, but in 2009, Dr Daniel Carlat wrote this about Dr Califf's then rumored candidacy for leadership of the FDA in the Carlat Psychiatry Blog,

look at these industry disclosures. He took money—lots of money--from 18 different pharmaceutical or device firms. Most of this was not for research, but for consulting and speaking, including CME. If Dr. Califf believes that it is ethical for physicians to help drug companies market their products, that’s his own business. But to elevate him to a position in which he is the country’s chief watchdog over unsafe medications and foods seems a dangerous move. With money from 18 drug companies padding his bank account, he will presumably spend most of his FDA career recusing himself from crucial decisions. Not a good idea.


There has been no mention of Dr Califf being a paid speaker for pharmaceutical companies in any of the recent reporting.  Dr Carlat implied that Dr Califf was paid to speak to further marketing objectives of pharmaceutical companies, that is, was giving "drug talks."  Since the publication of "Dr Drug Rep" in the New York Times in 2007, authored by Dr Carlat, the public has learned that such talks mainly include content provided by the pharmaceutical companies, and are meant by the companies as marketing exercises.  From that case we also learned that physicians who deviate from the marketing message do not last long on speakers' bureaus.  (See posts here and here.)

Paid speakers may be regarded by pharmaceutical companies as paid "key opinion leaders," KOLs, who serve a marketing function in the guise of academics. As noted here and here, the companies buying their services may believe they have bought the services of sales people.    Evidence about key opinion leaders actually performing like marketers has come from documents revealed during litigation (e.g., see this recent example of a huge monetary settlement made of charges that GlaxoSmithKline, a major multinational drug company committed fraud among other things, and in the course of its unethical activities used key opinion leaders as marketers).   Also, see the Neurontin marketing plan (see post here), and the Lexapro marketing plan (see post here) for examples of how company keaders view key opinion leaders as marketers.

So the revelation that Dr Califf received corporate payments for "education" suggests a bigger commitment to corporate marketing objectives than has previously been revealed.  

Summary

So, looking at not only current media reports, but media reports from earlier this year, and also proxy statements, the fine print of journal articles, and old blog posts, it appears that Dr Robert Califf really did have very substantial financial interactions with the drug, device and biotechnology industry.  These interactions likely underwrote his salary and his standing with the leaders of his former employer, Duke University.  Dr Califf seemed to be a paid speaker for drug companies on at least two occasions, suggesting that the companies may have put him in a covert marketing role, or viewed him as a paid key opinion leader.  Finally,  Dr Califf served on the board of directors of one drug company, a much deeper commitment than being a sponsored researcher or consultant.

Thus Dr Califf really appears to be one of the most, if not the most drug, device and biotechnology industry connected individual ever nominated to lead the agency that is the most important regulator of the US drug, device and biotechnology industry.  Some of his connections, particularly his previous membership on a pharmaceutical company board, and his previous roles as a paid pharmaceutical speaker, suggested not only financial relationships, but commitments to companies' financial and marketing goals.  These appear to be major conflicts of interest vis a vis Dr Califf's current leadership position at the FDA, and his nomination to be the ultimate leader of this regulatory agency.  This is the revolving door writ large.

As we have said very recently,  the revolving door can be veiwed as a species of conflict of interest.  Government officials who can look forward to extremely lucrative employment in health care industry may be much more inclined to seem friendly to the industry while in office.  Government officials who just came from industry are likely to maintain their industry mindset and be mindful of their industry friends.

Worse, some experts have suggested that the revolving door is in fact corruption.  As we noted here, the experts from the distinguished European anti-corruption group U4 wrote,


The literature makes clear that the revolving door process is a source of valuable political connections for private firms. But it generates corruption risks and has strong distortionary effects on the economy, especially when this power is concentrated within a few firms.
Furthermore, the ongoing and increasing revolving door phenomenon clearly suggests excess coziness between industry and government, now to the extent that industry and government leaders of health care are becoming interchangeable.  This suggests that health care is increasingly run by this cozy ingroup, who very likely put their own interests ahead of those of patients and the public.

The continuing egregiousness of the revolving door in health care shows how health care leadership can play mutually beneficial games, regardless of the their effects on patients' and the public's health.  Once again, true health care reform would cut the ties between government and corporate leaders and their cronies that have lead to government of, for and by corporate executives rather than the people at large.

ADDENDUM (28 September, 2015) - This post has been republished on the Naked Capitalism blog,  and OpEdNews.

ADDENDUM (28 September, 2015) - See also more detail on Dr Califf's activities on the Portola board on the PEU Report blog

Who Benefits? - Rising Generic Drug Prices and the Case of Mylan's Conflicted Property Purchases

Rising Generic Drug Prices

Health care costs in the US continue their seemingly inexorable rise.  Even the parts of health care that used to seem reasonably priced now are affected.  As Ed Silverman discussed on PharmaLot

prices for many generic drugs have been climbing, prompting concerns that a low-cost staple of the U.S. health care system might soon strain budgets.

Generic drugs, like practically every other part of US health care, have become big business.  As a Forbes article pointed out, the industry is becoming more consolidated, and more likely to suffer from manufacturing and regulatory issues.  However, there may be other reasons for increasing generic drug costs.

Case: Mylan Purchased Properties Developed by its Own Board Vice Chair

A recent Wall Street Journal scoop on the big generic pharmaceutical company Mylan suggested that maybe such companies are now suffering from the same leadership and governance ills we have been finding throughout US - and indeed global - health care.  Furthermore, to understand the impacts of such health care dysfunction, one must consider the incentives that underlie them, that is, who benefits?

The story concentrated on some dodgy deals involving the company and firms linked to the Vice Chairman of its board of directors.  The first part of the story was:

Generic-drug maker Mylan NV moved into new headquarters in December 2013 after buying vacant land in an office park near Pittsburgh and erecting a five-story building for about 700 employees.

The company hasn’t publicly disclosed that the office park’s main developer is Rodney Piatt, Mylan’s vice chairman, lead independent director and compensation-committee chief. The new headquarters was a big boost for the mixed-use real-estate development, called Southpointe II, where all the land has been sold and some of the last buildings are now rising.

Securities regulators require public companies to tell shareholders about any significant transactions with directors, executives or other 'related persons.' Members of boardroom compensation committees have special duties under securities and tax laws to avoid dealings that compromise their independence.

Mylan, now fighting a three-way takeover battle in the pharmaceutical industry, says there was no need to disclose Mr. Piatt’s connection to the $60 million real-estate project because he and the company avoided any direct dealings with each other.

The day before Mylan announced plans to build the new headquarters, a company managed and partly owned by Mr. Piatt sold a 7-acre site for $1 to an entity owned by a business partner in Southpointe II, according to property records reviewed by The Wall Street Journal. The partner’s firm sold the same land to Mylan for $2.9 million later the same day.

Also,

Real-estate records show a similar transaction in May. Mylan paid $9.2 million to buy an adjacent 11 acres from Mr. Miller, whose firm previously bought the land for $10 from a company partly owned by Mr. Piatt.

'Mr. Piatt was not a party to either transaction' involving Mylan and 'had no direct or indirect material interest in the transactions,' says a Mylan spokeswoman.

She adds that Mr. Piatt didn’t make a profit on either sale to Mylan because Mr. Miller separately arranged to buy out Mr. Piatt at cost and then sold the land directly to Mylan. Mr. Piatt didn’t return calls seeking comment.

Note however that

Securities rules require disclosure of any transaction of more than $120,000 where a related person will have a direct or indirect material interest, regardless of whether the person makes a profit.

In the case of compensation-committee members, related-party transactions can jeopardize the independence required of them under tax and securities rules. That can threaten the tax-favored status of some executive-pay programs and require executives to disgorge some of their gains on stock sales.

Some securities-law and corporate-governance experts say Mylan should have been more transparent about the real-estate transactions or handled them differently.

'The optics are terrible,' says Charles Elson, director of the John L. Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance at the University of Delaware and a director at HealthSouth Corp. and Bob Evans Farms Inc. 'Pittsburgh is a big town with no shortage of real estate. Either they could have gone somewhere else, or [Mr. Piatt] could have relinquished the directorship and eliminated the conflict.'


Just to emphasize the questions about Mr Piatt's independence,

The new headquarters is named the Robert J. Coury Global Center, after Mylan’s executive chairman. Mr. Coury, 54, was chief executive from 2002 to 2012.

A few months after the project’s approval by local officials, Mr. Piatt signed a pension amendment that increased the value of Mr. Coury’s promised benefits by 40%. His overall pension of $48.8 million is 11th-largest among executives at U.S. publicly traded companies, according to Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp.

Further muddying the waters,

During construction, Mylan hired project-management firm RIZ Consulting & Management Inc. to oversee the general contractor and architect. RIZ has the same business address and phone number as Mr. Piatt’s real-estate company, and he is listed as the contact person for RIZ in the local chamber of commerce’s membership directory.

RIZ’s president also is a top executive at Mr. Piatt’s company, and some employees of Mr. Piatt’s company worked for RIZ on the project, according to state records, construction documents and the minutes of permit meetings. RIZ’s president didn’t return calls seeking comment.

'They set it up that way because [Mr. Piatt] sits on the board of Mylan,' says Jeff Yates, a project manager with PJ Dick Inc., the general contractor for the Mylan headquarters project. 'It was kind of a conflict of interest, [so] RIZ was a separate company set up to be the owner’s rep.'
We often discuss how health care is tangled in a vast web of conflicts of interest.  The kinds of apparent conflicts of interest in play in this case are somewhat different from those we frequently discuss, but still seem part of this web.

In the last few days, other Pittsburgh newspapers have jumped into the fray, and found their own experts to question these deals.  Per the Post-Gazette,

'It doesn’t pass the smell test'” said Mel Fugate, a management professor at Southern Methodist University.  Mr. Fugate said that while the SEC places legal requirements on which transactions must be disclosed, the legal obligations are 'the lowest hurdle of them all.'

'This smells bad … even if they can prove legally there are no conflicts' he said.


Again, as noted above the law in certain instances may define conflicts of interest more narrowly than ethical definitions.  For example, the Institute of Medicine defined conflicts of interest in medicine: occurring "when an individual or institution has a secondary interest that creates a risk of undue influence on decisions or actions affecting a primary interest."

The Tribune weighed in,

'The whole thing stinks,' said Douglas Branson, a University of Pittsburgh law professor and an expert in corporate governance. 

Board members'have to serve the best interest of the corporation,' he said. 'You can't be both a seller and buyer — that's the classic definition of conflict of interest.

So here we see serious allegations of conflicts of interest affecting the Vice Chair of the Mylan board, and perhaps affecting another board member and former CEO.  These conflicts suggest that company operations could have been manipulated for these individuals' benefits.

Other Questions about Mylan's Leadership and Governance

Yet these are not the only examples of questions about Mylans' leadership and governance, questions which suggest that managers and board members may have been putting personal gain ahead of the larger interests of the corporation, its shareholders, and the patients who take its drugs


A Pittsburgh Business Journal article noted the "allegations of impropriety" raised by the current case, but also hinted at larger problems with the leadership and governance of Mylan.


Current CEO's Invalid MBA

Per the Pittsburgh Business Journal

Mylan (Nasdaq: MYL) has had ethics questions in the past. An MBA awarded to CEO Heather Bresch was withdrawn in 2008 following an investigation that found she didn’t complete the necessary course credits.

However, that finding did not apparently affect her ongoing career trajectory at Mylan

Former CEO's Use of Company Jet to Help Son's Rock Music Career

The Pittsburgh Business Journal also stated,

And in 2012, the Wall Street Journal found that [former CEO] Coury transported his son to rock concerts on the corporate jet, which was allowed as part of his employee benefits package.

That WSJ article emphasized,

 Nina Devlin, a spokeswoman for Pittsburgh-based Mylan, said Mr. Coury's employment contracts have allowed outside personal activities, 'including those related to his son Tino's career.' She said Mr. Coury isn't required to use the corporate jets but his employment contracts for the past decade have allowed personal use by him and his family.
Thus these contracts apparently allowed valuable Mylan resources to be expended in support of the former CEO's son's career, even though Tino did not apparently have any direct role in the company. Note that these revelations also apparently did not affect Mr Coury's career trajectory with the company, nor did those below.

Transactions Between Former CEO's Brothers and Mylan

That same WSJ article also found,

 This wasn't the only business relationship between the elder Mr. Coury and his brothers. Coury Investment Advisors, a company in which two of his brothers, Gregg and Paul, are principals, has served as a broker for Mylan's employee-benefit plans. Various insurers paid them $597,000 in the past three years for Mylan-related business, according to U.S. Labor Department filings.
That appeared to be another conflict of interest, benefiting different members of the former CEO's family.

However, that is still not the whole story.  A quick look through our magic files, and Google, revealed some other pieces.

Mylan Settled Allegations of Inflated Pricing

In 2010, we briefly posted about a settlement by Mylan of charges it falsely inflated prices for several drugs.
As is usual in such settlements, none of the people who authorized, directed or implemented the actions leading to this settlement apparently suffered any negative consequences, including the top managers on whose watch they occurred. 

Mylan Fired Executive Allegedly for Filing Whistleblower Lawsuit Against Another Company

In June, 2014, the Pittsburgh Tribune reported,

 When Mylan Inc. learned that its vice president of marketing had filed a whistleblower lawsuit against his previous employer, it fired him, the man alleged in a federal lawsuit filed Tuesday.


Note that the lawsuit was against Cephalon, not Mylan.  Rocking the boat, or blowing the whistle apparently are not rewarded at Mylan.

Current CEO Named US Patriot of the Year, then Moved Mylan to Netherlands

In 2014, some wondered how Heather Bresch, still the Mylan CEO, could have claimed to be ultra-patriotic while she was planning to move her company out of the US.  In 2011, Esquire listed Ms Bresch in an article on "Americans of the Year: Patriots." They were apparently particularly impressed that she had called for more inspections on foreign drug companies whose products are imported into the US. However, in 2014, per Ron Fournier in the National Journal.

This story is about a gilded class of people and corporations enriched by the new American economy while the rest of its citizens pay the tab. The protagonists could be any number of institutional elites, but this column happens to be about a Democratic senator from West Virginia, Joe Manchin, and his daughter, Heather Bresch, the chief executive of Mylan, a giant maker of generic drugs based outside Pittsburgh.

Her company's profits come largely from Medicaid and Medicare, which means her nest is feathered by U.S. taxpayers. On Monday, Bresch announced that Mylan will renounce its United States citizenship and instead become incorporated in the Netherlands – leaving this country, in part, to pay less in taxes.

This is the sort of story that makes blood boil in populists – voters from the Elizabeth Warren wing of the Democratic Party to libertarians who follow Rand Paul and including tea party conservatives. These disillusioned souls, growing in numbers, hate hypocrites who condemn the U.S. political system while gaming it.

Later, Ms Bresch's father, Senator Manchin, said what his daughter did should be illegal, again per another Ron Fournier article in the National Journal, whose title says it all:

Senator Manchin: What My Daugher Did Should be Illegal

Nonetheless, late in 2014, Bloomberg reported that not only would Mylan go ahead with the inversion, but it would pay the excess taxes personally incurred by its own executives due the transaction.  Such taxes were meant as a negative incentive to discourage such maneuvers.  Even so, top managers seemed to be able to pay themselves to avoid the effect of these incentives, and of course any resulting personal financial losses.


Summary

 The latest story about Mylan seemed to show a leading board member financially benefiting from transactions between the company over which he was supposed to exercise stewardship and his own company.  Other stories showed Mylan executives seeming to gain outsized benefits for themselves or their family members from Mylan beyond conventional salaries and corporate benefits packages. Of course, since Mylan is not just any company, but a very large generic drug company, putting top hired managers and boards of directors first may mean putting patients second.  The cost of these managers' and boards' interests may be at the expense of patients, and the public at large.

Thus perverse incentives enable mission-hostile management and ultimately health care dysfunction.

So once again, when considering how US, and global health care has become so dysfunctional, it makes sense to think about who is benefiting from the current dysfunction.  It very often is organizational insiders, particularly top hired managers, and sometimes those who are supposed to keep an eye on them. 

 Thus, like hired managers in the larger economy, health care managers have become "value extractors."  The opportunity to extract value has become a major driver of managerial decision making.  And this decision making is probably the major reason our health care system is so expensive and inaccessible, and why it provides such mediocre care for so much money. 

One wonders how long the people who actually do the work in health care will suffer the value extraction to continue?
As we have said far too many times - without much impact so far, unfortunately - true health care reform would put in place leadership that understands the health care context, upholds health care professionals' values, and puts patients' and the public's health ahead of extraneous, particularly short-term financial concerns. We need health care governance that holds health care leaders accountable, and ensures their transparency, integrity and honesty.

But this sort of reform would challenge the interests of managers who are getting very rich off the current system.

As Robert Monks said in a 2014 interview,



People with power are very reluctant to give it up. While all of us recognize the problem, those with the power to change it like things the way they are.

So I am afraid the US may end up going far down this final common pathway before enough people manifest enough strength to make real changes.

Value Extractors, "Super-Managers," Vampires and the Decline of the US and US Health Care

Appearing during the last few weeks were a series of articles that tied the decline of the US economy to huge systemic problems with leadership and governance of large organizations.  While the articles were not focused on health care, they included some health care relevant examples, and were clearly applicable to health care as part of the larger political, social, and economic system.  The articles reiterated concerns we have expressed, about leadership of health care by generic managers, perverse executive compensation, the financialization of health care, in part enabled by regulatory capture, and the abandonment by effective stewardship by boards of directors, but with new takes on them.

The articles included "Profits Without Prosperity," by William Lazonick in the the Harvard Business Review,  "Why Have US Companies Become Such Skinflints," by Paul Roberts in the Los Angeles Times, and "How Business Leaders Turned Into Vampires," by Steve Denning in Forbes, which in turn was partially based on "The Rise (and Likely Fall) of the Talent Economy," in the Harvard Business Review.

Let me summarize the main points, and discuss some health care examples.

"Super-Managers" as Value Extractors

Steve Denning's article contrasted people who  add value to the economy versus those who extract value.  The first species of value extractor he listed was:

 ‘Super-managers’ are people who hold administrative positions in the C-suite of private-sector bureaucracies but are masquerading as entrepreneurs. They are, to use Thomas Piketty’s slyly ironic term, “super-managers.” As such, they have been able to extract extraordinary levels of compensation. They have been lavished with stock and stock options and have been able to 'manage' the share price of their firms with massive share buybacks and other financial engineering so that they receive massive bonuses. As Bill Lazonick documented in the September 2014 issue of HBR, the net effect of their activities is to extract value, rather than create value [see below]. 

Presumably, "super-managers" as health care executives are also likely to be generic managers, unlikely to have much actual knowledge of caring for patients, unsympathetic to the values of health care professionals, and hence unlikely to uphold the health care mission.

He noted that

 there is a tendency to dismiss the activities of ‘vampire talent’ as de minimis. 'That’s capitalism, right? Every man for himself. It’s no big deal if there’s an occasional bad apple in the barrel. The ‘invisible hand’ of capitalism will make everything come out right for society in the end.'

However,

 The problem today is that the super-sized executive compensation, the gambling and the toll-keeping of the financial sector aren’t tiny sideshows. They have grown exponentially and are now macro-economic in scale. They have become almost the main game of the financial sector and the main driver of executive behavior in big business. When money becomes the end, not the means, then the result is what analyst Gautam Mukunda calls 'excessive financialization' of the economy, in his article, 'The Price of Wall Street Power,' in the June 2014 issue of Harvard Business Review.

Mr Denning further asserted that the value extraction of super-managers is augmented by the value extraction of two different groups of players, hedge funds that speculate with other peoples' money, and "tollkeepers" who extract rents through the financial system.

Furthermore, Mr Denning stated that

 The growth of super-sized executive compensation is inversely related to performance. The super-managers are in effect being rewarded for doing the wrong thing.
Of course, if executives in health care, like those in other sectors, are mainly concerned with enriching themselves in the short-term, than they are not mainly concerned with patients' and the public's health, or the values of health care professionals, and hence the performance of their organizations in terms of health care processes and outcomes will suffer. 

Furthermore, the ability of commercial health care firms to actually make a positive impact on health care will be decreased as they are whipsawed by other value extractors like hedge funds and tollkeepers.

Example - Renaissance Technologies

Mr Denning's first example of tollkeepers' value extraction was:

James Simons, the founder of Renaissance Technologies, ranks fourth on Institutional Investor’s Alpha list of top hedge fund earners for 2013, with $2.2 billion in compensation. He consistently earns at that level by using sophisticated algorithms and servers hardwired to the NYSE servers to take advantage of tiny arbitrage opportunities faster than anybody else. For Renaissance, five minutes is a long holding period for a share.

In fact, as we noted here, Renaissance Technologies does not hesitate in trading health care firms.  Furthermore, that company has a noteworthy direct tie to health care.  Its current co-CEO, Peter F Brown, is married to the current Commissioner of the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA).

Value Extraction and Share Buybacks

William Lazonick's article also emphasized how corporate leadership is now focused on extracting value from their companies for their own personal benefit, rather than promoting growth, innovation, better products and services, etc.  In particular, large public for-profit companies now tend to use their surplus capital to buy back shares of their own stock, rather than invest in new facilities, equipment, employees, etc.  Perhaps we should not be surprised that this was facilitated by changes in US government regulation, that is deregulation, in this case instituted during the Reagan administration:

Companies have been allowed to repurchase their shares on the open market with virtually no regulatory limits since 1982, when the SEC instituted Rule 10b - 18 of the Securities Exchange Act.

Note that

The rule was a major departure from the agency's original mandate, laid out in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  The act was a reaction to a host of unscrupulous activities that had fueled speculation in the Roaring '20's, leading to the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression.

Given the context, and that the deregulation was implemented by an SEC chair who was "the first Wall Street insider to lead the commission," this seems to be an example of regulatory capture in service of corporate insiders.

The issue here is that while it might make some financial sense for companies to buy back their own shares if they are priced at bargain rates, after this change they could buy shares at any price without supervision.  On one hand, such purchases could lead to short-term bumps in stock prices. On the other hand, a major reason for these buybacks appears to be that they enrich corporate insiders, particularly top hired executives, who now receive much of their pay in the form of stock and stock options, and often can get bonuses based on short-term increases in stock prices.  Lazonick wrote,

Combined with pressure from Wall Street, stock-based incentives make senior executives extremely motivated to do buybacks on a colossal and systemic scale.

Consider the 10 largest repurchasers, which spent a combined $859 billion on buybacks, an amount equal to 68% of their combined net income, from 2003 through 2012. (See the exhibit “The Top 10 Stock Repurchasers.”) During the same decade, their CEOs received, on average, a total of $168 million each in compensation. On average, 34% of their compensation was in the form of stock options and 24% in stock awards. At these companies the next four highest-paid senior executives each received, on average, $77 million in compensation during the 10 years—27% of it in stock options and 29% in stock awards. Yet since 2003 only three of the 10 largest repurchasers—Exxon Mobil, IBM, and Procter & Gamble—have outperformed the S&P 500 Index.

Example - Pfizer

Mr Lazonick's noted some potential outcomes of the frenzy of stock buybacks affecting the US pharmaceutical industry and hence the US health care system.

In response to complaints that U.S. drug prices are at least twice those in any other country, Pfizer and other U.S. pharmaceutical companies have argued that the profits from these high prices—enabled by a generous intellectual-property regime and lax price regulation— permit more R&D to be done in the United States than elsewhere. Yet from 2003 through 2012, Pfizer funneled an amount equal to 71% of its profits into buybacks, and an amount equal to 75% of its profits into dividends. In other words, it spent more on buybacks and dividends than it earned and tapped its capital reserves to help fund them. The reality is, Americans pay high drug prices so that major pharmaceutical companies can boost their stock prices and pad executive pay.

Moreover, during approximately the same period Pfizer compiled an amazing record of legal misadventures including settlements of allegations of unethical behavior, and some convictions, including one for being a racketeering influenced corrupt organization (RICO), as most recently reviewed here, and then updated here.  So while it was putting huge amounts into buybacks, it also put billions into legal fines and costs. This suggests that note only does executive compensation not correlate with "performance," it may also correlate with corporate bad behavior.

The "Shareholder Value" Dogma

In explaining how US corporate executives turned to stock buybacks to boost their own pay, at the expense of essentially everyone else, Mr Lazonick sounded some familiar themes.  One was focus on short-term revenues and short-term stock performance drive by the "share-holder value" dogma out of business schools,

the notion that the CEO's main obligation is to shareholders. It's based on a misconception of the shareholders' role in the modem corporation. The philosophical justification for giving them all excess corporate profits is that they are best positioned to allocate resources because they have the most interest in ensuring that capital generates the highest returns. This proposition is central to the 'maximizing shareholder value" (MSV) arguments espoused over the years, most notably by Michael C. Jensen. The MSV school also posits that companies' so-called free cash flow should be distributed to shareholders because only they make investments without a guaranteed return -- and hence bear risk.

But the MSV school ignores other participants in the economy who bear risk by investing without a guaranteed return. Taxpayers take on such risk through government agencies that invest in infrastructure and knowledge creation. And workers take it on by investing in the development of their capabilities at the firms that employ them. As risk bearers, taxpayers, whose dollars support business enterprises, and workers, whose efforts generate productivity improvements, have claims on profits that are at least as strong as the shareholders'.

Mr Denning similarly noted

The intellectual foundation of all this behavior is the notion that the purpose of a firm is to maximize shareholder value. Unless we do something about this intellectual foundation, the problem will remain. Changes in a few regulations or the tax code won’t make much difference. ‘Vampire talent’ will find ways around them.

Nor will change happen merely by pointing out that shareholder primacy is a very bad idea. Bad ideas don’t die just because they are bad. They hang around until a consensus forms around another idea that is better.


Mr Roberts' article "Why Have US Companies Become Such Skinflints," went at this issue from a slightly different angle, noting first


The bigger story here is what might be called the Great Narrowing of the Corporate Mind: the growing willingness by business to pursue an agenda separate from, and even entirely at odds with, the broader goals of society.

He attributed this to the notion promulgated by

conservative economists, [that] the best way for companies to help society was to ditch the idea of corporate social obligation and let business do what business does best: maximize profits.

He noted that this focus on short-term revenues has led to the decline in long-term results,

 But because management is so focused on share price and because share price depends heavily on current company earnings, strategic focus has grown ever more short term: do whatever is needed to hit next quarter's earnings target. And since cost-cutting is a quick way to boost near-term earnings, layoffs and other downsizing once regarded as emergency measures are now routine.

And here is the paradox. Companies are so obsessed with short-term performance that they are undermining their long-term self-interest. Employees have been demoralized by constant cutbacks. Investment in equipment upgrades, worker training and research — all essential to long-term profitability and competitiveness — is falling.

Of course, this is antithetical to the "innovation" that current corporate boosters proclaim as the goal of drug, biotechnology, medical device companies and other players in the brave new world of corporate health care.  


The Incestuous Mechanisms Used to Set Executive Compensation

Another explanation for the rise in value extraction, and specifically the use of share buybacks to reward top corporate hired executives, was the incestuous way in which corporations set pay for top hired executives. Mr Lazonick wrote,

Many studies have shown that large companies tend to use the same set of consultants to benchmark executive compensation, and that each consultant recommends that the client pay its CEO well above average. As a result, compensation inevitably ratchets up over time. The studies also show that even declines in stock price increase executive pay: When a company's stock price falls, the board stuffs even more options and stock awards into top executives' packages, claiming that it must ensure that they won't jump ship and will do whatever is necessary to get the stock price back up.

This is enabled by boards of directors who seem to represent the 'CEO union,' not stockholders, and certainly not other less favored employees, customers, clients or patients, or society at large,

Boards are currently dominated by other CEOs, who have a strong bias toward ratifying higher pay packages for their peers. When approving enormous distributions to shareholders and stock-based pay for top executives, these directors believe they're acting in the interests of shareholders.

Once again, this was also enabled by the dergulation that started with during the Reagan administration, and continues this day (although the specific relevant deregulatory change occurred during the Clinton administration),

 In 1991 the SEC began allowing top executives to keep the gains from immediately selling stock acquired from options. Previously, they had to hold the stock for six months or give up any 'short-swing' gains. That decision has only served to reinforce top executives' overriding personal interest in boosting stock prices. And because corporations aren't required to disclose daily buyback activity, it gives executives the opportunity to trade, undetected, on inside information about when buybacks are being done. 

Summary

Note that while all the discussion above has been about for-profit corporations, we have seen that in health care, various non-profit organizations, particularly hospitals, hospital systems, academic medical institutions, and health insurers, which all now operate in the current market fundamentalist environment, are acting more and more like for-profits.  So while non-profit corporate executives cannot do stock buybacks, they are also all too often generic managers, given huge compensation, but not often for upholding the mission, putting patients' and the public's health first, or upholding health care professionals' values.  

It is striking that we are beginning to see protests like those above not in radical publications, but in the Harvard Business Review and Forbes.  It is more striking that these protestors are beginning to fear the worst.  Mr Roberts wrote,

Sooner or later, markets punish such myopic behavior. Companies that neglect innovation run out of things to sell. Companies that demoralize workers see performance lag. 


Although Mr Denning hopefully wrote,

We are thus about to witness a vast societal drama play out. That’s because we have reached that key theatrical moment, which Aristotle famously called 'anagnorisis' or 'recognition.'  This is the moment in a drama when ignorance shifts to knowledge.  

He then warned,

As usual with anagnorisis and the shock of recognition at a disturbing, previously-hidden truth, there is a disquieting sense that the accepted coordinates of knowledge have somehow gone awry and the universe has come out of whack. This can lead to denial and a delay in action, even though the facts are staring us in the face.

If the recognition of our error comes too late, as in Shakespeare’s Lear, the result will be terrible tragedy. If the recognition comes soon enough, the drama can still have a happy ending. We are about to find out in our case which it is to be.
Let us hope that anagnorisis is really beginning, the anechoic effect is fading, and the drama may yet have a happy ending. 

ADDENDUM (29 September, 2014) - This post was re-posted on the Naked Capitalism blog

The RUC. "an Independent Group of Physicians?" - But It Includes Executives and Board Members of For-Profit Health Care Corporations and Large Hospital Systems

Introduction

We just discussed how a major story in Politico has once again drawn attention to the opaque RUC (Resource Based Relative Value System Update Committee) and its important role in determining what physicians are paid for different kinds of services, and hence the incentives that have helped make the US health care system so procedurally oriented.  (See the end of our last post for a summary of the complex issues that swirl around the RUC.)

The Politico article covered most of the bases, but notably omitted how the RUC may be tied to various large health care organizations, especially for-profit, and how the incentives it creates may benefit them. When the RUC membership first became public in 2011 due to efforts by Wall Street Journal reporters, I used internet searches to find that nearly half of the RUC members had conflicts of interest (look here).  Most of them were part-time paid consulting relationships, paid speaking engagements, and memberships on advisory boards involving drug, device, biotechnology and occasionally health insurance companies, or personal stock holdings in such companies.

In preparing my latest post, I found that to its credit, the AMA now makes the RUC membership more accessible (look here, free registration required.)  So I decided to check whether the current RUC roster still seems so conflicted.

As I did in 2011, I ran internet searches on all new RUC members since 2011, and updated searches on the continuing members.  Results are below.  Information new since 2011 is highlighted thus.  Note that I believe all the listed relationships are or were actual, but cannot rule out errors, especially given some RUC members have common names.  Any corrections are welcome.


The RUC Members and Their Financial Relationships

- Barbara S Levy, MD

Chair, RVS Update Committee
Federal Way, WA 2000

Consultant/Advisory Boards: Conceptus; AMS; Covidien; Halt Medical; Gynesonics; Idoman Medical (hysteroscopic surgery and sterilization, endometrial ablation, electrosurgery, vaginal hysterectomy) per UptoDate


-Margie Andreae MD
American Academy of Pediatrics
Ann Arbor, MI

Chief Medical Officer of Integrated Revenue Cycle and Billing Compliance, University of Michigan Health System, per University of Michigan Health System


- Michael D. Bishop, MD
American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP)
Bloomington, IN 2003

- James Blankenship, MD
American College of Cardiology (ACC)
Danville, PA 2000

Lecture fees from Sanofi-Aventis per New England Journal of Medicine
Financial relationships with  The Medicines Company, Abbott Vascular, Conor Med Systems, Portola Pharmaceuticals, Schering Plough, AGA Medical, Astra Zeneca, Abiomed, Bristol Myers Squibb, Tryton Medical, Kai Pharmaceutical, Novartis (Grants or Research Support) per Society for Cardiovascular Angiography and Interventions Disclosure Summary


- Robert Dale Blasier, MD
American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons (AAOS)
Little Rock, AK 2008

-Albert Bothe Jr MD
CPT Editorial Board
Danville PA

Executive Vice President and Chief Medical Officer, Geisinger Health Systems, per Geisinger


- Ronald Burd, MD
American Psychiatric Association (APA)
Fargo, ND 2006

-C Scott Collins MD
American Academy of Dermatology
Rochester, MN


- Thomas P Cooper MD
American Urological Association
Everett, WA

General Partner, Aperture Venture Partners LLC, (health care focused venture capital firm) , per Aperture
Member, Board of Directors, Kindred Healthcare, per Kindred
Member, Board of Directors, Hanger Inc (orthotic and prosthetic care), per Hanger
Member, Board of Directors, IPC/ the Hospitalist Company, per IPC



-Anthony Hamm DC
Health Care Professional Advisory Committee
Goldsboro, NC


- David F. Hitzeman, DO
American Osteopathic Association (AOA)
Tulsa, OK 1996


- Charles F. Koopmann, Jr., MD
American Academy of Otolaryngology-Head and Neck Surgery (AAO-HNS)
Ann Arbor, MI 1996

- Robert Kossmann, MD
Renal Physicians Association (RPA)
Santa Fe, NM 2009

Member of Advanced Renal Technologies Advisory Board, Network 15 Medical Advisory Board, Baxter Home Dialysis Advisory Board, Fresenius Medical Advisory Board per Renal Physicians Association

- Walter Larimore, MD
American Academy of Family Physicians (AAFP)
Colorado Springs, CO 2009

-Alan E Lazaroff MD
American Geriatrics Society
Denver, CO


- J. Leonard Lichtenfeld, MD
American College of Physicians (ACP)
Atlanta, GA 1994

Member, Physician Advisory Board, Aetna per Aetna 
Deputy Chief Medical Officer, American Cancer Society, per ACS

- Scott Manaker, MD, PhD
Practice Expense Subcommittee
Philadelphia, PA 2010

Consultant to Pfizer and Johnson and Johnson. Owns stock in Neose Technologies, Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson, and Rohm and Haas per Chest

-William J Mangold Jr MD
American Medical Association
Tuscon, AZ

Vice President, Board Developer Inc (health care management consulting firm), per Board Developer
Senior Advisor, ADVI (health care management consulting firm), per ADVI
Member, Board of Directors, Sante (post-acute health care company), per Sante


-Geraldine B McGinty MD
American College of Radiology,
New York, NY


- Gregory Przybylski, MD
American Association of Neurological Surgeons (AANS)
Edison, NJ 2001

Stock Ownership: United Healthcare (300 shares); Scientific Advisory Board: United Health Group (B, Spine Advisory Board) per NASS meeting

- Marc Raphaelson, MD
American Academy of Neurology (AAN)
Leesburg, VA 2009

personal compensation for activities with Jazz Pharmaceuticals and Medtronics as a speakers bureau member or consultant per AAN

- Sandra Reed, MD
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG)
Thomasville, GA 2009


GlaxoSmithKline Consulting, $1750 in 2009, $1500 in 2010 per ProPublica Dollars for Docs search through here

David H Regan MD
American Society of Clinical Oncology
Portland, OH

Payment from Cephalon in 2009 for $2200, per ProPublica search 



-Chad A Rubin MD
American College of Surgery
Columbia, SC


-Joseph R Schlecht
Pimrary Care Seat
Jenks, OK 


- Peter Smith, MD
Society of Thoracic Surgeons (STS)
Durham, NC 2006

Eli Lilly, Consulting, $1500 in 2009, $1990 in 2010 per Pro Publica Dollars for Docs search through here
Advisor or consultant to Bayer per Medscape

-Samuel D Smith MD
American Pediatric Surgical Association
Little Rock, AK


-Stanley Stead MD
American Society of Anesthesiologist
Encino, CA


J Allan Tucker MD
College of American Pathologists
Mobile, AL


- James Waldorf, MD
American Society of Plastic Surgeons (ASPS)
Jacksonville, FL 2008

- George Williams, MD
American Academy of Ophthalmology (AAO)
Royal Oak, MI 2009

Advisory Team, RetroSense Therapeutics
Shareholder and consultant for ThromboGenics Ltd. and holds intellectual property on the use of plasmin per Review of Opthamology
Alcon Laboratories, consultant, lecturer; Allergan, consultant, lecturer; Macusight, consultant, equity owner; Neurotech, consultant; Nu-Vue Technologies, equity owner, patent/ royalties; OMIC- Ophthalmic Mutual Insurance Company, employee; Optimedica, consultant, equity owner; Thrombogenics, consultant, equity owner per AAO meeting

Pfizer, “Professional Advising,” $5534 in 2009 per Pro Publica Dollars for Docs search through here
Member, Medical and Scientific Committee, Pixium Vision Inc, per Pixium 
Member, Board of Directors, Macusight Inc, per BusinessWeek.  


Summary 

The membership of the RUC continues to have a considerable number of apparent financial conflicts of interest.  By my count, in 2014, nearly half, 15/31 members had such conflicts.

Again, most of the conflicts were financial ties such as part-time paid consulting relationships, paid speaking engagements, and memberships on advisory boards involving drug, device, biotechnology and occasionally health insurance companies, or personal stock holdings in such companies.  A number of members who had such ties known in 2011 have several more such ties in 2014. 

In 2014, new kinds of conflicts of interest that appear even more intense have appeared.  Several members are now known to also be members of the boards of directors of for-profit health care corporations, including biotechnology, device, health care provider, and health care management services companies. 

We have been writing about the severe conflicts of interest presented by service on the boards of  health care corporationa.  In 2006 we first discussed a newly discovered species of conflict of interest in health care, in which leaders of medical or health care organizations were simultaneously serving on boards of directors of health care corporations.
 
We posited these conflicts would be particularly important because being on the board of directors entails not just a financial incentive.  It ostensibly requires board members to "demonstrate unyielding loyalty to the company's shareholders" [Per Monks RAG, Minow N. Corporate Governance, 3rd edition. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. P.200.]  Of course, after the global financial collapse of 2008 made us sadder and a little wiser, we realized that many board members actually seem to have unyielding loyalty to their cronies among top management.  However, in any case, the stated or actual interests of a member of the board of a health care corporation, like a pharmaceutical company or medical device company, could be very different and at odds with the mission of an academic medical institution or a non-profit ostensibly dedicated to improving health care quality, like in this case, the RUC of the American Medical Association.

Also, one new RUC member is apparently a top executive of a health care management services company, and another new RUC member is apparently a general partner of a health care venture capital firm. Again, such leadership roles create responsibilities that could be very much at odds with a leadership role in a very influential committee run by a physicians' society.

Finally, two new members are top executives of large, although admittedly non-profit hospital systems.  One member is now known to be a full-time executive of a large, non-profit disease specific patient advocacy organization.  While hospital systems' interests may overlap those of physicians, modern  hospital systems are often run by generic managers who put revenues ahead of all else.  Furthermore, in pursuit of revenues, hospital system leaders may be very interested in increasing utilization of the most lucrative, usually high-technology and procedural services, and thus in structuring physicians' incentives accordingly.  While disease-specific patient advocacy goups' interests may also overlap those of doctors, they may tend to be more interested in their diseases than all others.

By the way, note that AMA and RUC leaders often defend the RUC as purely physician run organization, e.g., the testimony of the RUC leader, Dr Barbara Levy, at a Senate hearing, per MedPage Today in 2011, (see this post),

The RUC is an independent group of physicians from many specialties, including primary care, who use their expertise on caring for Medicare patients to provide input to CMS [the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services],' RUC chair Barbara Levy, MD, said in a statement. 

But now it is clear that the RUC includes corporate executives and board members, and top hospital system executives.  These people may have MDs, but their loyalties appear divided.

We have questioned the tremendously influential role the RUC plays in setting the incentives that drive the US health care system.  Now it appears that the RUC membership remains conflicted.  Almost half work part-time for drug, device, biotechnology, and health insurance companies.  Several are in the top leadership and/or governance of various health care corporations and large non-profit hospital systems.  Thus it seems that the incentives that drive are health care system are under the influence of people who may put corporate or organizational revenue ahead of patients' and the public's health.

As we wrote before, the prevalence of conflicts of interest among RUC members highlight the need for a more accountable, transparent and honest system to manage how the government pays physicians, and a need for more transparency and accountability in the relationship among the government, health care insurance, and physicians.

As a first step, I submit that all RUC members who are executives or board members of for-profit health care corporations or large hospital systems step down from the RUC, or resign these positions.
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