Health Science

A new book has appeared on improving usability of electronic health records.  The result of government-sponsored work, the book is available free for download.  It was announced via an AMIA (American Medical Informatics Association, http://www.amia.org/) listserv, among others:

From: Jiajie Zhang [support@lists.amia.org]
Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 6:00 PM
To: implementation@lists.amia.org
Subject: [Implementation] - New Book on EHR Usability - "Better EHR: Usability, Workflow, and Cognitive Support in Electronic Health Records"

Dear Colleagues,

We are pleased to announce the availability of a free new book from the ONC supported SHARPC project: "Better EHR: Usability, Workflow, and Cognitive Support in Electronic Health Records".The electronic versions (both pdf and iBook) are freely available to the public at the following link:https://sbmi.uth.edu/nccd/better-ehr/

First, this book appears to be a very good resource at understanding issues related to EHR usability.  I particularly like the discussion of cognitive issues.

However, this book also holds messages about the state of the industry and the issue of regulation vs. no regulation, and impairment of innovation:

I think it axiomatic that user-centered design (UCD) is a key area for innovation, especially in life-critical software like clinical IT.  (I would opine that UCD is actually critical to safety and efficacy of these sophisticated information systems in a sociotechnically complex setting.)

I think it indisputable that the health IT industry has been largely unregulated for most of its existence, in the manner of other healthcare sectors such as pharma and traditional medical devices.

Yet, even in the absence of regulation, the book authors found this, per Section 5 - EHR Vendor Usability Practices:

a)  A research team of human factors, clinician/human factors, and clinician/informatics experts visited eleven EHR vendors and conducted semi-structured interviews about their UCD processes. "Process" was defined as any series of actions that iteratively incorporated user feedback throughout the design and development of an EHR system. Some vendors developed their own UCD processes while others followed published processes, such as ISO or NIST guidelines.

Vendor recruitment. Eleven vendors based on market position and type of knowledge that might be gained were recruited for a representative sample (Table 1). Vendors received no compensation and were ensured anonymity.

and

b)  RESULTS
Vendors generally fell into one of three UCD implementation categories:

Well-developed UCD: These vendors had a refined UCD process, including infrastructure and the expertise to study user requirements, an iterative design process, formative and summative testing. Importantly, these vendors developed efficient means of integrating design within the rigorous software development schedules common to the industry, such as maintaining a a network of test participants and remote testing capabilities. Vendors typically employed an extensive usability staff.

Basic UCD: These vendors understood the importance of UCD and were working toward developing and refining UCD processes to meet their needs. These vendors typically employed few usability experts and faced resource constraints making it difficult to develop a rigorous UCD process.

Misconceptions of UCD: These vendors did not have a UCD process in place and generally misunderstood the concept, in many cases believing that responding to user feature requests or complaints constituted UCD. These vendors generally did not have human factors/usability experts on staff. Leadership often held little appreciation for usability.

About a third of our vendor sample fell equally into each category.

In other words, a third of health IT sellers lacked the resources to do an adequate job of UCD and testing; and a third did not even understand the concept.

Let me reiterate:

In an unregulated life-critical industry, a third of these sampled sellers thought 'responding to user feature requests or complaints constituted UCD'.  And another third neglected UCD due to a 'lack of resources'.

I find that nothing short of remarkable.

I opine that this is only possible in healthcare in an unregulated healthcare sector.

Regulation, for example, that enforced good design practices and good manufacturing practices (GMP's) could, it follows, actually improve clinical IT innovation considering the observations found by these authors, through ensuring those without the resources either found them or removed themselves from the marketplace, and by making sure those sellers that did not understand such a fundamental concept either became experts it UCD, or also left the marketplace.

I can only wonder in what other fundamental(s) other sellers are lacking, hampering innovation, that could be improved through regulation.

As a final point, arguments that regulation hampers innovation seems to assume a fundamental level of competency and good practices to start with among those to be freed from regulation. In this case, that turns our to be an incorrect assumption. 

As a radio amateur, I often use the term "health IT amateurs" to describe persons and organizations who should not be in leadership roles in health IT, just as I, as a radio amateur, should not be (and would not want to be) in a leadership role in a mission-critical telecommunications project.

I think that, inadvertently, the writers of this book section gave real meaning to my term "health IT amateurs."  User centered design is not a post-accident or post-mortem activity.

-- SS

12/4/2014 Addendum:

I should add that in the terminology of IT, "we don't have enough resources" - a line I've heard numerous times in my CMIO and other IT-related leadership roles - often meant: we don't want to do extra work, to reduce our profits (or miss our budget targets), or hire someone who actually knows what they're doing because we don't really think that the expertise/tasks in question are really that important.

In other cases, the expertise is present. but when those experts opine an EHR product will kill people if released, they find the expert 'redundant', e.g., http://cci.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/?loc=cases&sloc=lawsuit.

Put in more colloquial terms, this is a slovenly industry that has always made me uncomfortable, perhaps in part due to my experience having been a medical safety manager in public transit (SEPTA in Philadelphia), where lapses in basic safety processes could, and did, result in bloody train wrecks.

Perhaps some whose sole experience with indolence and incompetence-driven catastrophe has been in discussions over coffee in faculty lounges cannot appreciate that viewpoint.

Academic organizations like AMIA could do, and could have done, a whole lot more to help reform this industry, years ago.

-- SS

In the past several days the media has been abuzz with stories about the admission, then the following retraction, by a Texas hospital that and EMR "flaw" had caused a man who had been in West Africa and was infected with the Ebola virus to be sent home, instead of admitted and put into isolation.

I wrote about these matters at my Oct. 2, 2014 post "Did Electronic Medical Record-mediated problems contribute to or cause the current Dallas Ebola scare?" (http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2014/10/did-electronic-medical-record-mediated.html) and the followup October 4, 2014 post
"Dallas Hospital reverses EHR-related explanation for fumbling Ebola case" (http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2014/10/dallas-hospital-reverses-ehr-relarted.htm).

A spectrum of the healthcare IT ecosystem seems represented (see http://cci.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/?loc=cases&sloc=ecosystem).  The technology enthusiasts and hyper-enthusiasts seem to believe the computer could have done no wrong (and usually lack medical and Medical Informatics expertise).

Some people such as myself with specific Medical Informatics experience and who know the failure modes via AHRQ, FDA, ECRI Institute etc. believe the EHR was quite likely contributory or causative of the mistake (see my April 9, 2014 post "FDA on health IT risk:  "We don't know the magnitude of the risk, and what we do know is the tip of the iceberg, but health IT is of 'sufficiently low risk' that we don't need to regulate it" (http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2014/04/fda-on-health-it-risk-reckless-or.html).

The reason I have written little after my initial two posts is that the only was to resolve the controversy is to actually examine the EHR screens, screen navigation and behavior of the EHR, if possible both before and after the hospital's stated "fix" of the problem, the EHR audit trails (automatically generated EHR accounting logs of user accesses, action taken, time, location etc.) and to examine the EHR in actual operation to evaluate it in context with the clinical setting in which it was installed.

Barring that, everything else is speculation usually biased either by the speculator's own beliefs about either the beneficence or fallibility of information technology in healthcare, and perhaps IT generally, and/or conflicts of interest.

Unfortunately, considering the health IT industry and environment, the only way I believe such an examination of the EHR can come about is via litigation.  I doubt it will come from the traditional regulators of medical devices and healthcare safety.

I do note the following of interest at Politico:

... While all EHRs difficult to use, some are set up better than others.

At Mount Sinai Hospital in New York City, information that a patient was feverish and recently flew in from Liberia would have set off an alarm, with the nurse’s screen flashing yellow and giving instructions to immediately isolate the patient, said Jason Shapiro, an emergency room physician and informatics expert at the hospital.

The nurse entering “fever” into the record would “get a hard stop. They immediately have to enter a response to a travel history question. And if there’s fever and the right kind of travel history, the whole isolation mechanism is supposed to swing into play,” Shapiro said.

... Both Mount Sinai and Texas Health Presbyterian have health records systems they purchased for hundreds of millions of dollars from Epic.

Read more: http://www.politico.com/story/2014/10/ebola-texas-electronic-records-111598_Page2.html

At least some users of EPIC seem to have a system configured to catch such a problem.  In my mind, this speaks the need to industry regulation, to ensure all EHRs meet basic standards of safety and reliability and are not haphazardly designed or implemented from one hospital to the next.

-- SS

10/9/14 Addendum:  

Prof. Jon Patrick of Australia, cited numerous times on this blog, relates this:

"I always talk about data capture and data reuse and the reuse is defined by the data flows required in the design of the system. EPIC might well have allowed for the the data capture but failed to deal with the data flow to properly effect the required reuse."

As may the implementers at the hospital in question also have failed at the flows supporting appropriate and fail-safe reuse in a hectic ED environment.

He adds, for further clarification:

A footnote to this point. We separate data flow from work flow. Data flow is the movement of data from context to reuse in another context, or you collect data on this screen(first context) and then you see it later on another screen (=another context).

Workflow is the route staff team members take in moving from one context to another, that is the movement from using one screen to another screen. Most often triggered by clicking a button that moves you to the chosen screen(next context).

The two are very different things and require close thinking in both cases to not trip up with unhelpful and frustrating system solutions.

Historically, Information Systems development has dealt with these issues both poorly and without adequate separate planning. In the past the focus has been on the data capture and storage, because the notion of reuse and context shifting has been left behind. This has been OK for many business systems where contexts have only small variations and workflow are simple or unimportant.

In medicine that just isn’t the case.

-- SS

Karen De Salvo has assumed the role of Director of ONC, the office of the National Coordinator for Health IT at HHS (http://www.healthit.gov/newsroom/dr-karen-desalvo-md).





A pretty face, but here's evidence of the same old tired political hucksterism and spin concerning healthcare information technology. 

In response to perhaps the most candid exposé in the public media to date of the risks and defects of current commercial health IT, industry conflicts of interest, and injuries and deaths, that appeared on July 20, 2014 in the Boston Globe under the title "Hazards tied to medical records rush" (http://tinyurl.com/lm7x34h) by the Globe's Washington bureau chief Christopher Rowland, Ms. De Salvo authored a letter to the editor.

DeSalvo is new to the job, but not to the political message of unbridled health IT hyper-enthusiasm and pointless "Safety Centers", instead of formal regulation as in other mission critical industries using IT (including pharma, for one).

Her letter to the Boston Globe attempts to put lipstick on a pig regarding a technology largely reviled by physicians and nurses due to its poor user experience and defects (rampant due to the free-for-all of this healthcare sector's unprecedented regulatory accommodation, that is, no regulation) that cause patient endangerment.  See http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/01/honest-physician-survey-on-ehrs.html, http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2014/02/ehrs-real-story-sobering-assessment.html and http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/11/another-survey-on-ehrs-affinity-medical.html as just a few examples.

What politicians do:  they spin like neutron stars

Her letter, with my comments:

http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2014/07/26/many-health-success-stories-note/MyyGM3uq2LU0GqGLLqYJ7M/story.html

Letters | CHALLENGES IN THE MOVE TO ELECTRONIC MEDICAL RECORDS

July 27, 2014

Many health-IT success stories to note

I was disappointed to read “Risks, some dire, tied to medical records rush” (Page A1, July 20), as it failed to mention any examples of patients and their health care providers benefiting from the use of health information technology, including electronic health records. 

Such success stories are playing out across the country daily, including in Boston, and their omission from the article incompletely portrays the important role of electronic health records in improving patient safety and outcomes.

Problem is, this is not how Western medicine is supposed to work - by HHS's own policies on research ethics, and international agreements and treaties based on work that arose after WW2's medical abuses, no less, e.g., the Nuremberg laws.

In medicine, legal and ethical standards such as the NIH Guidelines for Conduct of Research Involving Human Subjects (http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/hs/regulations.htm), the World Medical Association Declaration Of Helsinki (http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/) and others restrict introduction of new drugs and medical devices without informed consent, and without extensive preclinical and clinical testing and post-marketing surveillance, especially when risks of the technology are unknown.  

And health IT is decidedly experimental, considering we don't even know the true extent of harms, by multiple admissions (by FDA, IOM, ECRI etc., see http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2014/04/fda-on-health-it-risk-reckless-or.html).

Directives for Human Experimentation
NUREMBERG CODE

1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice [that is, to opt-out - ed.], without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision. This latter element requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject there should be made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonable to be expected; and the effects upon his health or person [information on HIT risk exists, such as on this blog - ed.] which may possibly come from his participation in the experiment. The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests upon each individual who initiates, directs or engages in the experiment. It is a personal duty and responsibility which may not be delegated to another with impunity.
2. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary physical and mental suffering and injury.
3. No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori reason to believe that death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps, in those experiments where the experimental physicians also serve as subjects.
4. During the course of the experiment the human subject should be at liberty to bring the experiment to an end [go back to paper - ed.] if he has reached the physical or mental state where continuation of the experiment seems to him to be impossible.
5. During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must be prepared to terminate the experiment at any stage [go back to paper - ed.], if he has probable cause to believe, in the exercise of the good faith, superior skill and careful judgment required of him that a continuation of the experiment is likely to result in injury, disability, or death to the experimental subject.

Perhaps they don't teach these things at Harvard?

Back to De Salvo's letter:

A fully electronic health system can help identify and prevent potential medical errors. The Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT has taken steps to address the safe use and implementation of electronic health records, including sponsoring the Institute of Medicine report referenced in the story.

And since that 2012 report, which acknowledges that bad health IT causes risks, errors and harms to a definite but unknown magnitude (see bottom section of my post at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/03/doctors-and-ehrs-reframing-modernists-v.html), ONC has done next to nothing. People are exposed to risk, harms and deaths and that seems just fine to ONC, for if it were not, they would have acted aggressively - say, as if a type of jet plane, or nuclear power plant had been revealed to pose risks and dangers to the community.

As Mr. Rowland himself pointed out in the Boston Globe article:

... In 2011, the Institute of Medicine said the lack of a central repository for reporting error-prone software, patient injuries, and deaths, combined with nondiclosure and confidentiality clauses in vendor contracts, “pose unacceptable risks to safety.”

It strongly recommended that the Obama administration mandate that vendors report “deaths, serious injuries, and unsafe conditions” to a centralized, government-designated entity. Such reports should be made available to the public, it said, without information that would identify individual patients and providers.

Three years later, no such reporting system exists.

Instead, ONC takes the GM ignition switch approach (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_General_Motors_recall):

... On February 7, 2014, GM recalled about 800,000 of its small cars due to faulty ignition switches, which could shut off the engine during driving and thereby prevent the airbags from inflating ... GM says it expects to charge $1.2 billion against its second quarter earnings as a result of its ongoing recalls, and the charge could get worse as lawsuits and investigations continue. 

The fault had been known to GM for at least a decade prior to the recall being declared.  Some have suggested that the company actually approved the switches in 2002 even though they knew they might not meet safety standards.

The company is facing multiple investigations into why it did not attempt to fix these faulty ignitions sooner, including a federal criminal probe, as well as a probe led by Anton Valukas, the latter of which produced a report which GM made public on June 5, 2014.

Instead of a serious approach to safety, ONC and De Salvo champion window dressing:

Most recently, the Office of the National Coordinator, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Federal Communications Commission issued a proposed plan that would include the creation of a health IT safety center, which would assist in the voluntary reporting of health IT-related medical errors. Many patient advocates, medical professionals, and other stakeholders have expressed support for this approach.

"Many?" - The consensus views, often dominated by industry insiders and others with conflicts of interest, is how ONC and De Salvo apparently think safeguarding the public is to be done.  Those who veer from this "consensus" with facts of risk and harms are to be ignored.

As to the hypocrisy and absurdity of a toothless "health IT safety center", see my April 9, 2014 post "FDA on health IT risk: reckless, or another GM-like political coverup?" at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2014/04/fda-on-health-it-risk-reckless-or.html.

The hundreds of thousands of providers successfully and safely using electronic health records today show that health IT can, and does, improve health and health care.

Dr. Karen DeSalvo
National coordinator for health information technology
Department of Health and Human Services
Washington

Ms. De Salvo apparently never got this Mar. 14, 2014 CMS memo that was sent in response to a query by the American Association  of Physicians and Surgeons:

CMS: "we do not have any information that supports or refutes claims that a broader adoption of EHRs can save lives."  [But let's spend hundreds of billions of dollars anyway.]  Click to enlarge.

However, in politics, such issues do not seem to matter as compared to passing along the party line. 

In medicine, they do matter.  Very much so (see http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/06/my-mother-passed-away.html).

-- SS